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Consciousness is at once the most famil-
iar and the most mysterious aspect of our 
existence. Conscious experiences deﬁ  ne our 
lives, but the subjective, private, and quali-
tative nature of these experiences seems to 
resist scientiﬁ  c inquiry. For much of the 
twentieth century, consciousness research 
remained the exclusive preserve of philoso-
phy, whose practitioners continue to grap-
ple with the so-called ‘hard problem’ of why 
physical or physiological processes should 
give rise to conscious experiences at all. Yet 
people have wondered about consciousness 
since they wondered about anything, and 
advances in our comprehension have been 
slow in coming.
Over the last two decades much has 
changed (Baars et al., 2003; Metzinger, 2003; 
Banks, 2009; Bayne et al., 2009). Alongside 
philosophical discourse a new science of con-
sciousness has taken shape which integrates 
experimental and theoretical work across 
many ﬁ  elds including neuroscience, psychol-
ogy, cognitive science, artiﬁ  cial intelligence, 
computer science, neurology, and psychiatry. 
Developing a naturalized account of the rich 
experiential tapestry of consciousness is now 
recognized as a major objective for twenty-
ﬁ  rst century science. Perhaps the key factor 
in the transition to scientiﬁ  c legitimacy was 
the realization that it may not be necessary to 
explain why consciousness exists in order to 
begin to unravel the physical and biological 
mechanisms that underlie its various proper-
ties. After all, physicists have laid bare many 
mysteries of the universe without accounting 
for the brute fact of its existence.
As this realization has taken hold, the 
excitement of consciousness research has 
become increasingly pervasive. I believe 
that this excitement is justiﬁ  ed. Though 
progress may at times seem slow, by exam-
ining core questions in consciousness sci-
ence we stand to learn a great deal about 
ourselves and our place in nature. Here, 
I offer a personal perspective on some 
of these core questions alongside some 
broader considerations raised by con-
sciousness research.
A ﬁ  rst core challenge is to specify the 
 necessary and sufﬁ  cient processes that under-
pin normal human consciousness (Edelman, 
2003; Koch and Tononi, 2008). We already 
know that we can do without large parts 
of the brain (e.g., the cerebellum) without 
appreciable degradation of consciousness. 
Bodily and environmental interactions also 
seem optional, at least for consciousness at a 
given time, as shown by dreaming and con-
ditions such as the locked-in state. Current 
consensus favors the thalamocortical system 
as the seat of the relevant neural machinery, 
however it is unknown which (if any) com-
ponents of this system are critical, or whether 
it is the dynamical activity patterns that ﬂ  ow 
across its neurons and synapses that matter 
most. Key to addressing this challenge will 
be to move beyond looking for correlations 
between (conscious) phenomenal properties 
and neural properties, towards identifying 
‘explanatory correlates’ that actually account 
for phenomenal properties (e.g., the simulta-
neously integrated and differentiated nature 
of experience) in terms of corresponding 
neural properties (Seth, 2009). Work in this 
direction, which will require both theoretical 
and experimental innovations, may help us 
answer probing questions such as why expe-
riences of color are qualitatively different 
from experiences of sounds, or of odors.
Consciousness is not a unitary phenom-
enon. We can distinguish conscious level (a 
scale from coma or brain-death to fully vivid 
conscious awareness) and conscious content 
(the components of each conscious experi-
ence). Conscious contents themselves dif-
ferentiate into (at least) multimodal sensory 
contents related to the world; experiences of 
selfhood, volition, and agency; and affective 
and somatic perceptions. We now need to 
understand the extent to which these com-
ponents are separable, what their respec-
tive neural underpinnings may be, and how 
eventually they are integrated into the seam-
less ﬂ  ow of our normal conscious lives.
A related challenge lies in identifying 
the function (or functions) of conscious-
ness. Setting aside the red herrings of 
  epiphenomenalism (the notion that con-
sciousness has no function) and ‘conscious 
inessentialism’ (the idea that all cognitive 
and behavioral functions can in principle be 
carried out in the absence of consciousness) 
allows us to consider a range of possible 
functions for the different components of 
consciousness. Current candidates include 
supporting voluntary and/or rational action; 
enabling ﬂ  exible and integrated responses to 
richly structured environments; acquiring 
new skills; correcting errors in perception 
and action; simulating potential threats (in 
dreams), and enabling effective social cogni-
tion. All of these remain controversial but 
most can be experimentally interrogated. An 
important avenue for further progress will 
be to better understand the capabilities and 
limitations of unconscious (implicit) proc-
esses, and the interactions between such 
processes and explicit, conscious states.
A mature science of consciousness 
requires effective means for measurement 
of conscious content and conscious state, 
both for mapping experimental evidence 
to theory and for designing perspicuous 
experiments. Measures of consciousness 
can be objective (e.g., behavioral responses, 
measured brain signals) or subjective (e.g., 
introspective reports, conﬁ  dence ratings). 
While it is unlikely that any single measure 
will prevail, recent advances have involved 
combining in single experiments multi-
ple measures of both kinds. More gener-
ally, solving the measurement problem 
will require distinguishing between neural 
mechanisms giving rise to consciousness per 
se from mechanisms that enable its subjec-
tive report: this distinction is sometimes 
referred to in terms of ‘phenomenal’ versus 
‘access’ consciousness and it may also relate 
to the interaction between consciousness 
and self-hood.
Another fundamental challenge is to 
understand the nature of disorders of 
consciousness, as they affect both state 
(e.g., coma, the vegetative and minimally 
consciousness states, and epileptic absence 
seizures) and content (e.g., psychiatric Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research    March 2010  | Volume 1  |  Article 5  |  2
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closed’ to us in the same way that an appre-
ciation of quantum mechanics is inacces-
sible to frogs. While the possibility cannot 
be ruled out, accepting it achieves nothing 
and the history of human intellectual inge-
nuity suggests that there is plenty more we 
can know that we cannot yet conceive of. 
The grand challenge of consciousness rests 
on this hope. Its pursuit is distinguished by 
combining transformative questions about 
the human condition with a tractable and 
largely incremental programme of experi-
mental and theoretical research. There is 
every reason to be optimistic.
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during human development. While this 
challenge may appear more tractable than 
that of identifying animal consciousness, it is 
not certainly so and potential answers carry 
heavy political and social implications. For 
example, how would society react if it were 
shown that babies remained unconscious 
until several months following birth?
Third, is it possible to devise a conscious 
artifact? If consciousness is assumed to 
depend on the laws of physics, chemistry, 
and biology, then however imperfectly these 
laws are currently known the answer must 
be yes. What is not known is what kind of 
artifact will be adequate. Contemporary 
computational and robotic models of con-
sciousness may best be seen as simulations 
rather than instantiations, in the same sense 
that a computational model of a hurricane 
is not itself windy. However, as models of 
consciousness progressively build in con-
straints that counter theoretical objections 
and cater to empirical mismatches that arise 
from previous attempts, so the new models 
may tend towards instantiation. Of course, 
it is presently impossible to know whether 
a model that is sufﬁ  ciently rich to account 
causally for all properties of consciousness 
will be implementable in computers or 
robots, or whether it will require implemen-
tation in neural or some other material.
The new knowledge gained as we unravel 
the mechanisms of consciousness will have 
substantial practical, ethical, moral and 
even legal consequences. Practically, we may 
witness a raft of new clinical interventions 
as well as new methods for manipulating 
conscious experiences in healthy subjects. 
Ethically and morally we may confront 
new dilemmas relating to clinical decision 
making and to the treatment of non-human 
animals. Legally, we may face complex issues 
involving assignment of responsibility, aris-
ing from new insights into the power of 
unconscious processes and into the neu-
ral mechanisms underlying volition and 
agency. This is of course an incomplete and 
labile list: its constitution will change as our 
understanding develops and deepens.
In conclusion, consider for a moment 
the pernicious perspective of ‘mysterian-
ism’, the notion that a naturalized account of 
consciousness may exist but is ‘cognitively 
disorders, focal brain lesions leading to 
neglect and agnosia, and certain degenera-
tive neurological illnesses). Work in this area 
is progressing particularly rapidly (Owen 
et al., 2009). New neuroimaging and psy-
chophysical methods have allowed detec-
tion of residual consciousness in patients 
previously diagnosed as vegetative, allowing 
more effective prognosis and palliative care 
and in some cases restoring communica-
tion. New perspectives are also emerging in 
psychiatry. For example, schizophrenia has 
been related to deﬁ  ciencies in ﬁ  ne-grained 
predictions of the consequences of self-
generated actions, and ‘depersonalization 
disorder’ – a condition in which the world, 
and/or the self, loses its phenomenal ‘reality’ 
– may be associated with deﬁ  cient integra-
tion of exteroceptive signals with interocep-
tive, autonomic signals. Quite apart from 
the obvious clinical signiﬁ   cance of this 
research, disorders of consciousness will 
provide an increasingly important window 
onto the neural and cognitive mechanisms 
of unimpaired consciousness.
We may also look ahead to three chal-
lenges that might remain on the horizon 
for some time to come. Responses to these 
challenges, when they do arise, may however 
hold the greatest potential for transforming 
our understanding of our place in nature.
First, which non-human animals are 
conscious, and when did consciousness 
arise in evolution? (Edelman and Seth, 
2009). Already many of us tacitly ascribe 
consciousness to primates and many other 
mammals, though ascription of full-ﬂ  edged 
self-consciousness remains more controver-
sial. Moving beyond mammals, perhaps a 
strong case can be made for birds (especially 
corvids and parrots) and there is tantaliz-
ing evidence of behavior consistent with 
consciousness in some cephalopods (e.g., 
Octopus vulgaris) though knowledge of cor-
responding neural properties is sorely lack-
ing. But where do we draw the line? Can a 
case be made for consciousness in bees, or in 
fruit ﬂ  ies? And what would it take to ascribe 
a conscious ‘I’ to any non-human animal?
Consciousness and conscious self-hood 
must have beginnings in ontogeny as well as 
in phylogeny. The second challenge is there-
fore to identify when these properties arise 